User profiles for Daniel N. Ostrov

Daniel Ostrov

Professor of Mathematics and Computer Science, Santa Clara University
Verified email at scu.edu
Cited by 818

A finitely extensible bead-spring chain model for dilute polymer solutions

LE Wedgewood, DN Ostrov, RB Bird - Journal of non-newtonian fluid …, 1991 - Elsevier
The FENE-P dumbbell, that is, the finitely extensible non-linear elastic dumbbell with the
Peterlin approximation, has been used extensively to describe the rheological behavior of dilute …

Conspicuous consumption dynamics

D Friedman, DN Ostrov - Games and Economic Behavior, 2008 - Elsevier
We formalize Veblen's idea of conspicuous consumption as two alternative forms of interdependent
preferences, dubbed envy and pride. Agents adjust consumption patterns gradually, …

A new approach to goals-based wealth management

SR Das, DN Ostrov, A Radhakrishnan… - Available at SSRN …, 2018 - papers.ssrn.com
We introduce a novel framework for goals-based wealth management (GBWM), where risk
is understood as the probability of investors not attaining their goals, not just the standard …

On the early exercise boundary of the American put option

DN Ostrov, J Goodman - SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 2002 - SIAM
We study the short time behavior of the early exercise boundary for American style put options
in the Black--Scholes theory. We develop an asymptotic expansion which shows that the …

Solutions of Hamilton–Jacobi equations and scalar conservation laws with discontinuous space–time dependence

DN Ostrov - Journal of Differential Equations, 2002 - Elsevier
We establish a unique stable solution to the Hamilton–Jacobi equation u t +H(K(x,t),u x )=0,
x∈(−∞,∞), t∈[0,∞) with Lipschitz initial condition, where K(x,t) is allowed to be …

Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games

D Friedman, DN Ostrov - Journal of Economic Theory, 2013 - Elsevier
Any absolutely continuous, piecewise smooth, symmetric two-player game can be extended
to define a population game in which each player interacts with a large representative …

Balancing small transaction costs with loss of optimal allocation in dynamic stock trading strategies

J Goodman, DN Ostrov - Siam journal on applied mathematics, 2010 - SIAM
We discuss optimal trading strategies for general utility functions in portfolios of cash and
stocks subject to small proportional transaction costs. We present a new interpretation of …

[PDF][PDF] Dynamic systemic risk: Networks in data science

SR Das, S Kim, DN Ostrov - The Journal of Financial Data Science, 2019 - srdas.github.io
Systemic risk arises from the conflu-ence of two effects. First, individual financial institutions (FIs)
experience increases in the likelihood of default. Second, these degradations in credit …

Viscosity solutions and convergence of monotone schemes for synthetic aperture radar shape-from-shading equations with discontinuous intensities

DN Ostrov - SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 1999 - SIAM
The shape-from-shading (SFS) equation relating u(y,r), the unknown (angular) height of a
surface, to I(y,r), the known synthetic aperture radar (SAR) intensity data from the surface, is I = …

Gradient dynamics in population games: Some basic results

D Friedman, DN Ostrov - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2010 - Elsevier
When each player in a population game continuously adjusts her action to move up the
payoff gradient, then the state variable (the action distribution) obeys a nonlinear partial …